2 enjoy tacit support from a reform wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), heightening hopes for political liberalization from above. Even the June Fourth massacre, followed as it was by the sudden collapse of communism across Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, did not stifle predictions of democratization in China. Although the Chinese state was no longer seen as a likely source of top-down political reform, scholars sought the seeds of bottom-up political liberalization in the escalating popular protest, vibrant associational activity, commercialized media, and contentious Internet debate that marked post-Tiananmen society (Ding 2002; Gilley 2004; Goldman 2005; O'Brien and Li 2006; Ogden 2002; G. Yang 2009; Zhao 1998) .
Today, however, nearly forty years after Mao's death and more than a quarter century after Tiananmen, the China field has largely retreated from predictions of imminent democratization in favor of resignation to authoritarian endurance (Heilmann and Perry 2011; Reilly 2012; K. Tsai 2007; L. Tsai 2007; Whyte 2010) . The very factors that once were heralded as harbingers of political transformation-protests, NGOs, social media, a rising middle classare now more often portrayed as operating within state-controlled constraints, thereby contributing to system stability rather than to regime change (J. Chen and Dickson 2010; Chen Xi 2012; Wright 2010 ). Even the rare China scholar who prophesies the impending collapse of the Communist system does not paint a rosy democratic future. 1 Moreover, Chinese leaders themselves appear more committed than ever to the perpetuation of CCP rule. Xi Jinping's recently announced "four comprehensives" (sige quanmian四个全面) of governance-building a moderately prosperous society, deepening reform, governing the nation according to law, and being strict in governing the Party-repeat the familiar mantras of his autocratic forerunners. A "princeling" whose political power derives from his family connection to the 3 founding generation of Chinese Communists, Xi has an obvious stake in maintaining and legitimizing the existing political system. Prospects for electoral democracy appear dim indeed.
Not only has China come to be viewed as a bastion of authoritarianism; increasingly it is seen as intent upon exporting its undemocratic practices in a calculated bid to displace the United States and its democratic way of life. A new book by Michael Pillsbury (2015) claims that China's actions are guided by a secret plan known as the "Hundred-Year Marathon," which seeks to restore China to its "proper" place atop the global hierarchy by establishing a new world order favorable to China. Chinese strategy, Pillsbury maintains, includes undermining the appeal of an American model of electoral democracy. A recent article in the Journal of Democracy by Larry Diamond (2015, 151) also warns that the Chinese are "pushing back against democratic norms" by trying "to discredit Western democracies and democracy in general, while promoting their own models and norms."
Observers are certainly correct to point to an emergent Chinese assertiveness, which is apparent in the PRC's muscular approach to everything from old maritime disputes (e.g., the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) to new multilateral institutions (e.g., the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Asian Infrastructure Development Bank). But China's growing confidence in performing on the world stage has not actually been accompanied by an attack on democratic norms or democracy in general, nor has it been buttressed by overt proselytizing of alternative authoritarian models and norms. As China specialist Andrew Nathan (2015, 158) (Xi 2014, 163-64 In contrast to this indigenous populist tradition, contemporary CCP theorists counterpose Anglo-American democracy as deriving from a Western tradition of "humanism"
(renben sixiang 人本思想) that stretches from the ancient Greek adage, "Man is the Measure of All Things," through the Renaissance to Enlightenment conceptions of natural rights. My student responded with exaggerated humility, "Oh! You come from America. What does democracy really mean to you?" The reporter stammered, "Well, er, um, you know, elections I guess." "Ah," said the student, "I think more in terms of Rousseau and the model of direct participation." (Calhoun 1997, 243-44) While this particular student was surely more articulate on the subject of democracy than many
Chinese citizens (not to mention American journalists), her answer does nevertheless indicate a more populist conception of democracy than a Schumpeterian stress on competitive elections would imply. In this populist view, the goal is not to restrain government, but to empower it through the active political participation of the citizenry. The student's reference to JeanJacques Rousseau in this regard is apt-evoking a radical understanding of democracy that infused not only the 1989 student movement, but also the Cultural Revolution that preceded it.
Political theorist Benjamin Schwartz (1970, 158-60) noted shortly after the onset of the Cultural
Revolution that the ideological underpinnings of Mao's tumultuous campaign bore more than a passing resemblance to Rousseau's doctrines of "civic morality" and "general will" as applied by Most of the resources and methods we made use of to mobilize the masses were ones that the Communist Party had used many times before. . . . As soon as we began our revolution, we became extremely conceited -just as if we had reverted to the time of the Cultural Revolution and felt ourselves to be the most revolutionary. As soon as we joined the 1989 protest movement, we considered ourselves to be the most democratic.
After all, had we not fasted for democracy and devoted ourselves to it and made sacrifices for it? . . . Our voice became the only truth. (Liu Xiaobo 1994, 315, 318) The conflation of revolutionary mass participation and Communist Party leadership with "democracy" was certainly a hallmark of Maoism (Mao 1940) . But the tendency to identify the will of the people with the strength of the nation has an older lineage, reflected in Chinese visions of democracy ever since Liang Qichao's seminal writings on the subject in the late nineteenth century. As Andrew Nathan (1985, 128) When respondents were asked which three (out of five) factors posed the greatest obstacles to building democracy in China, "severe corruption" topped the list, with 72 percent of respondents selecting it; "leaders not fully committed to serving the people" was second with 52 percent; "severe bureaucratism" came in third with 48 percent; "inadequate mass supervision of government" ranked fourth with 46 percent; and "lack of regular competitive elections" came in a distant last, with a mere 19 percent of respondents choosing it as a major obstacle to China's democratization (91).
This general disinterest in electoral democracy may help to explain the notable lack of enthusiasm among mainland Chinese for Hong Kong's Occupy Central Movement last year (Yang Hengjun 2014) . For many in the PRC, the real issue at stake in the protests was not the restrictive regulations for electing the Hong Kong chief executive. Popular discourse in the mainland denounced the Hong Kong demonstrators as unpatriotic ingrates whose actions 12 betrayed both a lack of gratitude for China's generous assistance to the Island and a deplorable deficit of "Chinese cultural identity" (Zhonghua wenhua rentong 中华文化认同).
THE CHINA DREAM
An emphasis on Chinese cultural identity is at the heart of Xi Jinping's China Dream, Employing a brand of extravagant rhetoric once reserved for praise of Chairman Mao's 13 revolutionary line, the CCP was re-Orienting its propaganda to showcase the glories of the ancient civilization that it now claimed to be representing and reviving (Perry 2013) .
In framing the national quest as a "dream," Xi Jinping draws upon imagery that has figured prominently in Chinese statecraft, philosophy, and literature for millennia. Oracle bone artifacts show that the interpretation of dreams in ancient China was often linked to critical military and political decisions by state rulers (Brennan 1993). The Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi is remembered for his vivid butterfly dream, which implied the possibility of radical transformation through active imagining and awakening (Watson 1996) . 4 The most famous novel in the Chinese literary canon is Dream of the Red Chamber; indeed, an entire field of academic research, known as "Redology" (hongxue 红学), is devoted to its study. Chinese people that both includes and transcends the Han majority nationality along with the fifty-five minority nationalities that together officially comprise the People's Republic of China (Elliott 2015, 187) . This expansive ethnocultural construction is intended to appeal not only to a domestic constituency, but also to overseas Chinese who are expected to identify culturally and sympathize emotionally with the rise of the motherland. The growing pride and prosperity of the Chinese nation is seen as enhancing popular sovereignty, or "minzhu."
Massive anti-PRC protests in both Hong Kong and Taiwan last year suggest that not everyone in Greater China dreams the same dream, however. As the case of Taiwan in particular demonstrates, Chinese political culture is not uniform. Nor does Chinese culture pose an insuperable barrier to liberal democratization-even when "princelings" are in command.
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After all, Chiang Ching-kuo was also derided as a "princeling" when he first inherited the reins of power in Taiwan, yet he defied expectations by breaking with his father's autocratic practices.
It is hard to imagine Xi Jinping following in the footsteps of Chiang Ching-kuo, however.
Xi's Anti-Corruption Campaign and Mass Line Education and Practice Campaign, with their hardhitting attack on cadre corruption and harkening back to Mao's call to "serve the people" by adhering to the "mass line," are clearly intended to appeal to pervasive populist sentiments among PRC citizens. His approach is unlikely to promote change in a direction that most
Americans would recognize as democratic, but-to the extent that Xi's efforts succeed in significantly reducing official corruption and bureaucratism-his fellow compatriots may well credit him with advancing the CCP's century-long commitment to building minzhu. in the past, due no doubt to his insistence on the fundamental incompatibility between "old"
CONCLUSION: INTELLECTUAL LIMITS OF THE POPULIST DREAM
Confucian and "new" revolutionary ideas (Wasserstrom 2015) .
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In this day of the ubiquitous China Dream, it is worth recalling a remarkable statement that Lu Xun composed, not long before his death, on the subject of dreams:
To dream is to be free zuomeng, shi ziyou de(做梦，是自由的)，
To talk about dreams is be unfree (shuomeng, jiu buziyou说梦，就不自由).
To dream is to dream real dreams (zuomeng, shi zuo zhenmeng de做梦，是做真梦的)，
To talk about dreams is surely to lie (shuomeng, jiu nanmian shuohuang说梦，就难免
说谎). (cited in Wang 2015)
The elegant verse of the most eloquent voice of the "Chinese Enlightenment" advises due skepticism toward the official articulation of dreams, implying the inherent limits of the Party's publicly proclaimed vision of populist democracy. 
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